Federal Reserve: A division of power by Charles Gerena
A
pril 2 had a special meaning
for Richmonders in the years
following the Civil War. It was
that date in 1865 when Southern 
soldiers fled the Confederate capital
as Union troops approached, setting
fire to tobacco warehouses and bridges
during their retreat. The ensuing con-
flagration and looting that followed
the next morning left smoldering piles
of rubble where newspaper offices,
banks, and hotels once stood.
Almost a half century later, the 
date would bring a feeling of vindica-
tion to a city that spent decades
recovering from that devastating fire
and the economic upheavals of the
Reconstruction era. On April 2, 1914,
it was announced that Richmond
would become one of 12 cities to serve
as a base of operations for the Federal
Reserve System.
The Fed’s formation culminated
years of debate over what kind of 
central bank the United States needed
to avert liquidity problems and bank
failures in the future. Should the Fed
be governed by the private sector in
association with government officials
or by political appointees? Should 
the Reserve banks have a high level 
of autonomy or be mere branches 
of a powerful central authority? For 
various economic and political rea-
sons, Congress decided on a regional
approach with the Federal Reserve 
Act of Dec. 23, 1913.
That was only half the battle. For
the next three months, the Reserve
Bank Organization Committee made
some tough choices on the number of
Reserve banks, the boundaries of the
districts that the banks would serve,
and the headquarters city for each 
district. The latter task attracted 
formal petitions from 37 cities, 
including Baltimore; Washington,
D.C.; Charlotte; Columbia, S.C.; 
and Richmond.
Every contender had its merits, its
fierce supporters, its political levers.
While Richmond was smaller in 
population compared with Baltimore
or Washington, the city loomed large in
the eyes of Southern businessmen. 
This was reflected in the flow of capital
at the time. Richmond’s national 
banks loaned $33.5 million to borrowers
in 13 Southern states as of January 1914,
more than any other community 
in the country — except New York — 
and four times greater than Baltimore 
and Washington combined. This 
historical connection likely gave the
River City an edge in gaining a 
Reserve bank.
The Conflict
The Reserve Act designated who
would serve on the organization com-
mittee: Treasury Secretary William
McAdoo, Agriculture Secretary David
Houston, and Comptroller of the
Currency John Williams. (Williams
wasn’t confirmed by the U.S. Senate
until mid-January so he missed the
early stages of the committee’s work.)
While all eyes focused on these men,
the initial preparation of a districting
plan fell to a group of experts led by
Henry Parker Willis, an economist
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in November 1914, less than
a year after the city’s 
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Act and would later serve as secretary
for the first Federal Reserve Board.
The committee’s mandate was clear
but the path to meeting that mandate
was not. The only criteria were a few
paragraphs in the enabling legislation. 
For example, each Reserve bank 
district had to open with at least 
$4 million in paid-in capital from its
member banks. That may not sound
like much by today’s standards, but 
the average resources of state and
national banks in 1915 amounted to 
just $916,000 per institution. The
Reserve Act required member banks to
pay 6 percent of their resources into 
the new central bank, or $54,960 
per institution based on the average 
capitalization at that time. So, it would
take about 73 banks of average size to
put a Reserve bank over the $4 million
threshold.
That made drawing district lines
tricky. Banking resources were 
concentrated in the Northeast, neces-
sitating the division of the region into
several smaller districts to prevent any
one Reserve bank from commanding
too much capital at the expense of
other banks. The reverse was true on
the West Coast — economic activity
was spread out so the district bound-
aries had to be drawn as broadly as
possible to ensure that each bank was
large enough to serve its constituents.
In addition, there had to be at 
least eight Reserve bank districts, but
no more than a dozen. Here, the ten-
sion between a centralized and a
regional system of central banking
reasserted itself.
Prominent bankers in large cities
wanted the minimum number of dis-
tricts, with New Yorkers advocating a
Reserve bank in their city that con-
trolled most of the Northeast and
seven other banks with less power and
geographic scope. They felt a domi-
nant New York Fed was necessary in
order to win the respect of the finan-
cial community abroad.
Businessmen in smaller and more
rural communities who wanted their
interests served by the nation’s new
central bank had the opposite view.
They wanted as many Reserve banks as
possible, evenly distributed throughout
the country and roughly the same size.
Advocates of this approach also includ-
ed populists like William Jennings
Bryan; Treasury Secretary McAdoo,
who feared a dominant New York Fed
would overshadow the other Reserve
banks; and Henry Willis, who felt each
Reserve bank needed to be strong and
self-supporting.
Also, a regionally balanced central
bank would be better positioned to
address seasonal imbalances between
supply and demand in regional capital
markets. According to University of
Idaho economists Jon Miller and
Ismail Genc, rediscounting commer-
cial paper was the primary tool of
monetary policy, given the rigidities of
using the gold standard to regulate the
money supply. “At times of high loan
demand, regional Reserve banks could
accept commercial paper owned by
member banks as collateral for loans
to them to expand the reserve base,”
they wrote in a 2002 article.
Ultimately, neither side of the
debate got everything they wanted.
Twelve districts were drawn and the
capital paid into the Federal Reserve
System was divided as evenly as possi-
ble, but the New York Fed still ended
up with more capital than the four
smallest Reserve banks combined.
The New York Fed wasn’t as large as its
supporters wanted — that would have
resulted in one bank commanding
about half of the system’s total capital-
ization — but it still ended up being
the largest and the most influential. Its
vaults have held gold reserves for for-
eign countries since 1924, its president
assumed a permanent spot on the
Federal Open Market Committee in
1943, and its domestic trading desk has
conducted the Fed’s open market
operations since the 1920s. 
Finally, the Reserve Act required
that “districts shall be apportioned
with due regard to the convenience
and customary course of business.”
Railroad and telegraph lines had to
connect each Reserve bank city with
the communities it served so that
checks could be delivered for clearing,
member banks could present their 
collateral in person for loans of
reserves, and bank employees could
keep abreast of credit conditions.
At the Reserve Bank Organization
Committee’s first official meeting 
on Dec. 26, 1913, McAdoo and
Agriculture Secretary Houston 
decided to focus on three factors when
choosing a Reserve bank location: geo-
graphical convenience to member
banks, the industrial and commercial
development needs of communities
within a district, and the established
custom and trend of business. 
“In laying out the districts and
establishing the headquarters for
Reserve banks, every effort will be
made to disturb as little as possible
existing conditions, and to promote
business convenience and normal
movements of trade and commerce,”
noted McAdoo and Houston in a
statement released the next day.
“While the committee appreciates the
local pride and sentiment which are
prompting many cities to urge their
claims, [it must arrive] at sound con-
clusions through consideration of
fundamental and vital factors.”
The Prize
Even before the organization commit-
tee officially began its work, cities
began petitioning for a Reserve bank.
“Reserve cities are springing up all over
the United States,” Houston lamented
to President Woodrow Wilson in a 
letter sent three days after the commit-
tee’s initial meeting. “Certainly nobody
could have imagined that so many
[cities] had strategic locations.”
Winning a Reserve bank was seen 
as good for business, though its 
precise economic impact was unclear.
According to David Hammes, an econ-
omist at the University of Hawaii at
Hilo, the responsibilities of the Federal
Reserve System weren’t fully known.
“Nobody knew what was being created,
not even the people on the committee,”
Hammes says. Some businessmen 
confused the role of the Reserve banks
with commercial lenders.
Hammes adds, Uncle Sam didn’t
have the local presence and economic
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the creation of a regionally oriented
central bank represented one of 
the first federal projects of national
scope, promising to bring some form
of government employment to com-
munities, though the magnitude was
still to be determined.
Finally, having a Reserve bank near-
by would provide a convenient source
of coin and currency, check handling,
and other services to commercial
banks. Among other things, this was
expected to benefit firms involved in
correspondent banking, which encom-
passes a variety of services that one
bank provides to another bank, such as
payments processing and foreign 
currency settlement. 
During the selection process,
McAdoo pointed out that the loca-
tion of a Reserve bank in a city
wouldn’t be as important to their eco-
nomic development as many assumed.
In retrospect, it is possible that access
to the Fed’s efficient check clearing
and discount window services indi-
rectly helped businesses in the
immediate vicinity of a Reserve bank.
However, it is equally possible that
the Reserve bank cities were already
progressing more than other locales,
which is why they were chosen. 
In Richmond’s case, its selection as
a Reserve bank site was credited for
elevating its status as a regional finan-
cial center. The city also had a lot
going for it economically in the early
20th century.
Despite the turmoil of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, Richmond
remained a center of trade and finance
in the “Old South.” James Dooley, a
wealthy railroad executive, described
the city in this manner in a letter to
Comptroller Williams. “Richmond is
still to all intents and purposes the cap-
ital of that great division of the United
States which lies between the Atlantic
Ocean and the Mississippi, south of
the Mason and Dixon’s line,” Dooley
wrote. “She is the capital city of their
business, the capital city of their bank-
ing, the capital city of their affections.”
Washington and Baltimore both had
commercial ties to the South and
retained many of its cultural traditions.
But Richmond was more closely iden-
tified with the region.  
Also, goods and capital in the
South Atlantic tended to flow from
south to north. Therefore, a Reserve
bank in Richmond would be able to
accommodate those regional flows
and still be within reach of the
Northeast’s economic centers. 
The Campaign
Even with these advantages, 
Richmond initially wasn’t a contender
for a Reserve bank, according to a
book by Henry Willis in 1923 on 
the central bank’s history. “In none 
of the preliminary surveys of the 
situation was the establishment of a
bank at Richmond, Va., ever seriously 
considered,” he wrote.
Willis himself considered a
Richmond Fed “unnecessary” since
Reserve banks in Atlanta and
Philadelphia would be accessible to
most of the Southeast and Mid-
Atlantic. “He thought he had the
Eastern Seaboard covered,” Hammes
notes, so having a Reserve bank in
Richmond “didn’t solve an economic
problem.” 
Others believed that if the East 
was to be divided into multiple
Reserve bank districts, Baltimore or
Washington were better suited for a
bank headquarters. 
The Maryland Bankers Association
and other trade groups supported
Baltimore for several reasons. The port
town handled a large volume of foreign
trade, plus it was a center of domestic
trade in the South Atlantic region.
Supporters argued that the extent of
Baltimore’s trade within the region
wasn’t fully reflected in clearinghouse
data since a “tremendous volume” of
transactions was handled by jobbing
houses and manufacturing plants. 
Bankers and businessmen in nearby
states said they had close financial ties
to Baltimore and wanted to expand
them. John Mayo, a Kentuckian who
helped develop the state’s coal and tim-
ber resources, was one of them.
“Baltimore has lent us money for the
development of our resources when we
could not get it anywhere else and when
New York turned us down,” he said in a
Baltimore Sun article. “If our paper is to
be rediscounted, we want it held in a
city in which we feel at home...”
The Washington Clearing House
Association and other organizations
believed their hometown deserved a
Reserve bank because of the city’s
prominence as the seat of the federal
government. Also, the bank would be
near the Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve Board that was desig-
nated to manage the new central bank. 
“If one of such banks be located in
Washington directly under the vision
of the Federal Reserve Board, that
supervisory authority can watch … the
work that is being carried on, note
how the bank serves the purpose for
which it is intended, and decide from
personal contact and observation what
rules and regulations are needed to
bring all such banks to a high state 
of efficiency,” noted Henry McKee 
of the Clearing House Association in
his testimony to the Reserve Bank
Organization Committee.
Oliver Sands, a prominent Rich-
mond banker, initiated that city’s
lobbying efforts on Dec. 29, 1913, less
than a week after the Reserve Act was
enacted. He called a meeting of local
banks eligible for Federal Reserve
membership to discuss the idea of 
having a district headquarters in
Richmond. Later that day, the Business
Men’s Club met to discuss the matter. 
Both groups agreed to pursue a
Reserve bank, calling on representa-
tives from the private and public
sector to form a joint “Committee on
Locating a Federal Reserve in
Richmond.” The committee coalesced
two days later, with Sands serving as
the chairman.
A corps of stenographers and
administrative assistants worked from
a conference room at the Business
Men’s Club to gather information and
send promotional literature to commu-
nities throughout the South Atlantic.
Teams of volunteers also toured 
the region to convince local bankers.
George Seay, who worked for the joint
committee as a consultant and would
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Richmond Fed, gave several talks dur-
ing an 11-day tour of the Carolinas.
Richmond managed to win over
many Carolinians, including the presi-
dent of the North Carolina Bankers
Association and the former mayor of
Charleston, S.C. The support wasn’t
unanimous, however. Some Tar Heels
wanted a Reserve bank in Charlotte,
while others in the Palmetto State pre-
ferred Columbia. Eventually, both
cities mounted their own campaigns.
West Virginians were torn. Many
bankers in the Mountain State felt
more closely aligned with their neigh-
bors in Ohio and Pennsylvania than
with Virginia and other South Atlantic
states. Wheeling, W.Va., bankers
wanted to be included in a Reserve
bank district along with Pittsburgh, a
city that it had economic ties with. In
January 1914, a poll of state and nation-
al banks in West Virginia revealed a
preference for a Reserve bank in
Pittsburgh or Cincinnati; Baltimore
was also a popular option, while
Richmond was the first choice of only
17 bankers. 
Meanwhile, McAdoo and Houston
had to act quickly. The Reserve banks
were to be open for business by Nov.
16, 1914, less than a year after the
Reserve Act was enacted. So, during
six weeks in January and February, the
gentlemen and a small entourage visit-
ed 18 cities on a highly publicized
fact-finding mission, starting in New
York City and ending in Cleveland.
During their cross-country travels, a
stenographer recorded more than
5,000 pages of testimony from more
than 300 witnesses. 
Representatives from Virginia and
the Carolinas traveled to the nation’s
capital on Jan. 15 to present
Richmond’s case. Several hundred
strong, the group greatly outnum-
bered other delegations from
Baltimore, Charlotte, and Columbia
which crowded into Williams’ office
at the Treasury Department during
three days of hearings in Washington.
(Williams, who was the assistant
Treasury secretary at the time, did not
stay for the hearings since he wasn’t
yet confirmed as Comptroller of the
Currency.)
Seay presented his brief, prepared in
just 18 days, outlining why Richmond
should have a Reserve bank. The thor-
oughness of the stat-heavy brief, as well
as of follow-up documents submitted
about a month later, reportedly
impressed McAdoo and Houston.
Backers of a Reserve bank in Charlotte
and Columbia were also apparently
swayed by Seay’s arguments, which
were published in a bound volume and
widely circulated. Those cities’ cam-
paigns fizzled in the face of growing
support for Richmond.
The Fallout
Comptroller Williams joined McAdoo
and Houston to work on the commit-
tee’s plans for the rest of February and
all of March. On April 2, 1914, they
announced the fruits of their labor. 
At the close of business that day, 
a crowd gathered at the Richmond
offices of John L.Williams, a prominent
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When the Reserve Bank Organization Committee wanted to take the pulse of the
banking industry in 1914, there were no toll-free numbers that bankers could call or
Web-based surveys they could answer. Instead, the Treasury Department mailed card
ballots to each of the 7,471 national banks that had formally accepted the terms of
membership in the new central bank system. The ballot asked for a first, second, 
and third choice for the location of a Reserve bank that bankers preferred to be 
associated with. “The ballots were gathered prior to designation of any district bound-
aries, so banks were unconstrained in their choice of cities,” noted University of Hawaii
at Hilo economist David Hammes in a September 2001 article in The Region, published
by the Minneapolis Fed. “Comments by committee members in the various cities indi-
cate that they had access to the results of the balloting prior to both the completion of
their tour and their deliberations,” which ended on April 2, 1914, with their announce-
ment of the Reserve bank district boundaries and headquarters cities. 
In a statement released eight days later in defense of its decisions, the committee
members noted that bankers in North Carolina and South Carolina didn’t want to be
aligned with a Reserve bank located to their south or west. Instead, Carolinians 
preferred Richmond, which was the obvious favorite of Virginian bankers.
Not surprisingly, bankers polled in the District of Columbia and Maryland wanted
a Reserve bank in Washington and Baltimore, respectively. But the committee 
members chose not to locate a bank in one of those cities, in part, because either
would have been too close to the Philadelphia headquarters of the Third District. In
addition, “the industrial and banking relations of the greater part of the district were
more intimate with Richmond than with either Washington or Baltimore,” they wrote
in their statement. 
South Carolina’s capital city, Columbia, was the first choice of 28 national banks in
the Palmetto State versus 11 for Richmond. But when the votes were added up, the 
latter city came out on top by garnering more second-choice votes: 27 for Richmond
versus five for Columbia. Richmond also received far more first- and second-choice
votes than Baltimore, Washington, or Charlotte from banks in North Carolina and
Virginia. Baltimore did garner the most second-choice votes in West Virginia, placing
it behind Pittsburgh in the final tally.
The views of West Virginia’s bankers were especially divided, according to the 
committee’s statement. So, the Northern Panhandle counties of Marshall, Ohio,
Brooke, and Hancock were placed in the Fourth District, where they had business ties
to the cities of Cincinnati and Pittsburgh. Those who had wanted to be associated with
a Reserve bank in either of those cities, however, were still disappointed because the
district’s headquarters was located in Cleveland. (Pittsburgh and Cincinnati were later
chosen as branch locations for the Fourth District.) The rest of West Virginia ended up
in the Fifth District. — CHARLES GERENA
Popularity Contest
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comptroller. Richmond’s mayor and
Virginia’s governor anxiously waited
with local bankers and businessmen to
hear the announcement. 
E.L. Bemiss, comptroller Williams’
brother-in-law, kept his ear to the
phone “and conversation fell to a
whisper,” according to a news report
in the Richmond Times-Dispatch. Three
men stood by a map of the United
States to trace the boundaries of the
Reserve bank districts as they were
announced.
Finally, the call came from
Comptroller Williams at 6:30 p.m.
Bemiss relayed every word as
Williams announced the 12 Reserve
bank districts and boundaries one by
one. “There was a dramatic and
intense moment as the list of Reserve
Bank cities and their regions came
over the wire,” the Times-Dispatch
described. “When Richmond’s name
was called, bank presidents grasped
hands and held them while they
cheered together. Soon messenger
boys were struggling into the crowded
rooms with telegrams of congratula-
tions from all sections of the country.”
Richmonders celebrated as if they
had gained a major league baseball
team or the Summer Olympics. The
next evening, the upscale Jefferson
Hotel hosted a mass meeting and 
buffet dinner sponsored by the local
chamber of commerce.  
Elsewhere, though, the selection
of Richmond and other Reserve bank
cities wasn’t as well received. New
York, Chicago, St. Louis, and San
Francisco were obvious choices for
Reserve banks. They were centers of
business and finance, had large popu-
lations, and were designated under
the National Bank Act of 1864 as
cities where national banks had to
maintain reserves equal to a percent-
age of their deposits. Other choices
were less obvious and subject to ques-
tion. Baltimore and Washington,
D.C., were clearly disappointed. So,
too, were New Orleans and Denver.
City leaders in both towns thought
that they were deserving of a Reserve
bank. Denver, in particular, ques-
tioned the wisdom of placing a
Reserve bank in Kansas City, giving
Missouri two banks.
The Reserve Bank Organization
Committee offered a general explana-
tion of how it drew district lines and
selected headquarters cities, from the
ability of a Reserve bank to assist busi-
nesses in its district to the district’s
economic track record and future
prospects. Still, accusations flew of
committee members playing politics. 
Several Reserve bank cities had ties
to high-level members of the
Democratic Party, which was reinvigo-
rated after taking control of  Congress
in 1910 and the White House in 1912.
For example, Rep. Carter Glass, chair-
man of the House banking and finance
committee, President Wilson, and
Williams had strong Virginia connec-
tions and played pivotal roles in the
formation of the Federal Reserve
System. Glass, in particular, played a
major role in crafting the Reserve Act
and ushering it through Congress.
For several days, lawmakers on
Capitol Hill debated the validity 
of the organization committee’s 
choices. Glass gave an impassioned
speech on April 8, 1914, defending
Richmond’s selection and the 
committee’s motives.
“The business of the national banks
in Virginia, including Richmond, is 
far ahead of the business of the 
national banks of Maryland, including
Baltimore, or any other of the five
states embraced in [the Fifth
District],” he argued. As of Jan. 13, the
capital and surplus of Virginia’s nation-
al banks amounted to $32.9 million,
compared with $31.3 million in
Maryland, $18 million in West Virginia,
$13.3 million in North Carolina, $12.6
million in the District of Columbia,
and $10 million in South Carolina. 
The organization committee even-
tually answered its critics by issuing
another statement on April 10.
Committee members argued that they
wanted to choose cities which were
growing in importance. Richmond’s
national banks were the largest source
of loans, outside of New York, for 
businesses in the South. Also, they held
more deposits from the region’s banks
than Baltimore or Washington, even
though the latter were among the cities
where banks had to park their reserves.
To provide further justification for
its decisions, the committee released
the results of a nationwide poll of 
7,471 national banks. The poll was 
likely taken because many bankers 
had opposed the creation of the Fed, so
the committee members wanted to be
sure they felt included in the process.
The organization committee 
closely followed the preferences
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*Only four cities in total received votes from national banks in the District of Columbia.
SOURCE: Reserve Bank Organization Committee, 1914
Poll of National Banks, Top-Five Preferences for Reserve
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of the 12 cities that garnered the most
support were selected as Reserve bank
cities. Cleveland got the nod instead of
Cincinnati or Pittsburgh, both of
which were the preference of banks in
the Fourth District. 
Unmoved by the organization 
committee’s assertions of objectivity,
protests continued over Richmond’s
selection. The mayor of Baltimore and
Maryland’s governor led a massive
demonstration at a downtown theater
on the evening of April 15. More than
3,000 people attended, lining up in the
pouring rain from the time the doors
were opened until well after the 
meeting’s start.
While other rivals eventually
accepted the Reserve bank plan,
Baltimore didn’t back down. On 
April 29, the Regional Reserve Bank
Committee of Baltimore asked the
organization committee to reconsider
and delay the formation of the
Richmond Fed pending an appeal to
the Federal Reserve Board. When the
organization committee refused to do
either, Baltimoreans crafted a detailed
brief and sent it directly to the 
newly appointed Reserve Board on
Sept. 11, 1914. 
The brief argued, among other
things, that Baltimore was a natural
point of trade and its total banking
resources far exceeded Richmond
when taking into account the capital
of the city’s trust companies and
mutual savings banks. In a formal
rebuttal, George Seay pointed out that
trusts were unlikely to join the Federal
Reserve while mutual savings banks
couldn’t join, so their resources
shouldn’t have been counted. (This
might have skewed the results of the
poll as well since only Federal Reserve
member banks were sent ballots.)
Despite these efforts, Baltimore
lost its bid for a Reserve bank when
the U.S. attorney general ruled in April
1916 that the Federal Reserve Board
didn’t have the authority to tinker
with the locations of Reserve banks.
Less than two years later the city did
get a branch office that has grown into
the eighth-largest check processor for
the Federal Reserve System, handling
620 million checks in 2005.
The Legacy
Were the organization committee’s
decisions politically motivated? “The
key role played by Virginians in devis-
ing, legislating, and … implementing
the new system no doubt provided
encouragement” to Richmond’s
boosters, wrote James Parthemos, 
former director of research at the
Richmond Fed, in a 1991 article for 
the bank’s Economic Review. 
However, Parthemos didn’t think
politics played a decisive role. “That
the Richmond leaders were not pre-
pared to count on political favoritism
is indicated by their retention at some
early stage of two of the nation’s 
highly regarded professional banking
consultants to evaluate the case 
for locating a Reserve bank in
Richmond,” he noted.
If the organization committee was
politically motivated, then the choices
for Reserve bank cities initially 
suggested by Henry Willis in a confi-
dential report to the committee would
have differed significantly from the
committee’s final plan, assuming that
Willis wasn’t merely telling the 
committee what it wanted to hear. In
fact, there were only two differences
— Willis selected Portland and
Cincinnati, while the committee
chose Richmond and Dallas. 
Several researchers have found 
that the organization committee’s 
decisions were likely based on 
economics, not just politics. For 
example, economist Michael McAvoy
at the State University of New York at
Oneonta compared a decisionmaking
model based on economic factors with
a model based on political preferences.
He determined that the former was a
better predictor of what the commit-
tee members agreed upon. 
“The [organization committee]
selected the proper 12 FRB locations
based upon bankers’ preferences, city
population, [banking system] capital
growth, and population growth,”
McAvoy described in a July 2006 
article. “Given these objective criteria,
the [committee] likely maximized
social welfare rather than its own.”
People have continued to push for
some changes — a branch of the
Richmond Fed opened in Charlotte in
December 1927 after years of lobbying
led by a local banker, while bankers
and local government officials in
Washington tried and failed to get a
branch for their city in the 1970s. And,
economists Miller and Genc, among
others, have proposed reevaluating the
district boundaries to better reflect
regional economic relationships. 
Still, as the saying goes, the proof 
of the pudding is in the eating. The
operational structure of the Federal
Reserve System has persisted through
two World Wars, 17 recessions, and 
16 U.S. presidents. RF
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